



















Can Archaeology Recover Past Intentions?
The issue of intentionality lies at the heart of most archaeological interpretation. In the
course of excavation or analysis we uncover the traces of sequences of human actions that
we then proceed to interpret in terms of an original form or an original purpose or
meaning that lay inside the minds of prehistoric or early historic individuals.
To take a very simple example, we see a polished stone axe as an intentional end-product,
and an axe rough-out as evidence of an arrested process, on the assumption (perhaps quite
a reasonable one) that the desired objective was in each case to produce a polished stone
axe. Many of those abandoned at the rough-out stage are interpreted by archaeologists
who look for imperfections in the raw material or other blemishes — which again assumes
a particular intentionality — that the makers would have completed the work if only some
such factor had not come to dissuade them. The problem of ‘intended’ form underlies (and
indeed threatens to undermine) many typological approaches in archaeology; at the very
least it questions whether the patterning that we see corresponds to some desired and
intended end-product. It is easy to assume that Palaeolithic flint-knappers had in mind the
image of an end-scraper or a backed knife when they set about their task, but is this borne
out by ethnography?
Such ambiguities are not restricted to artefacts but apply also to settlement, economy and
symbolic or ritual behaviour. Were prehistoric burial mounds designed as finished wholes
and built stage by stage, by successive generations, according to a preconceived plan? Or
were they constantly in process of modification and redescription? Can we distinguish
sacred spaces from profane? Can we determine whether particular effects were intended or
were merely chance by-products; the acoustics of enclosed spaces such as burial chambers
pose particular challenges of interpretation. Rock art may appear to depict animals such as
deer or boar: but are these real, living animals or are they mythical or symbolic beings?
The concern with the built and the made extends into the wider prehistoric landscape
when we consider the meanings traditionally attached to rivers, lakes or mountains. These
are sometimes materialized (or at least hinted at) through special practices of deposition or
though the carving or painting of images at sacred locations. This may lead us to suppose
that particular places in the landscape held a special significance, but can or should we
seek to go further, and suggest what meaning or meanings were attached to them?
The contributions to this Viewpoint consider issues of intentionality across a range of
archaeological contexts, from lithics to landscape. There are no simple answers, but a careful
reading of patterning and innovation may allow informed insights into the ways in which
past individuals interacted knowledgeably and intentionally with their surroundings and
with each other.77
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Mind and Body in Landscape Research
Christopher Tilley
‘Don’t you find it all a bit depressing in the end?
You’ll never really know what was going on’ (stu-
dent comment)
Intentionality  would  seem  to  be  the  fundamental
concept  in  all  prehistoric  landscape  research.  We
want to know the reasons why people chose to settle
in  one  place  or  another,  built  particular  types  of
monuments where they did, how they moved around
the landscape, procured, exchanged and consumed
material and non-material resources, deposited arte-
facts,  etc.  If,  then,  we  are  hoping  to  interpret  the
patterns we perceive in the landscape in terms of
intentions  or  reasons,  archaeological  research  be-
comes inevitably cognitive in nature: we all have to
be mind-readers.
From a traditional perspective, understanding
the nature of prehistoric minds supposedly provides
the key to interpreting material culture because the
latter is a product of the former. We have to try and
reconstruct the way people thought about the land-
scape in order to understand the manner in which
they lived in it. Reconstructions of these prehistoric
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mind-sets in the literature — usually implicit, be-
cause  particular  types  of  cognitive  processes  are
rarely discussed — currently range between the ex-
tremes of a utilitarian logic of practicality and func-
tionalist efficency, and a symbolic logic without any
apparent constraint apart from, perhaps, its own in-
ternal coherence. Landscapes and environments ei-
ther more or less determine what people do or they
are blank slates in which anything becomes possible.
Yet whatever kind of logic we infer we’re all
bad mind-readers at the end of the day. Almost all
statements in archaeological publications are replete
with standard qualifications, the words: ‘perhaps’,
‘possibly’, ‘could be’, ‘might be’ fill our texts simply
because the one thing that we can be certain about is
that we can’t think like prehistoric people and can
never know their minds.
This, of course, is only the tip of the interpre-
tive iceberg. Besides people having intentions or rea-
sons  for  their  actions  we  may  need  to  consider
differences between individual intentions and col-
lective intentions. Then there are the unintended con-
sequences, or outcomes of actions, which need to be
taken into account, differences between the reasons
behind making something and how it is received
and understood by others. Furthermore, differences
between  discursive  consciousness  and  practical,
routinized or ‘habitual’ thought may be important.
A classic understanding in anthropological research
is that people frequently say one thing and do an-
other. The reasons for their actions may typically be
rationalized afterwards and therefore do not pro-
vide a reliable guide anyway to understanding why
they have acted in one way or another. Fortunately
this is not a problem for archaeologists as the ar-
chaeological record is the outcome of actual practice.
Nevertheless, unacknowledged reasons or intentions
are often fundamental: people may not be fully aware
themselves of what they are doing and why. So the
intentions an archaeologist might reconstruct would
often not be the same as those which might have
been  held  by  prehistoric  agents  if  we  could  only
interview them. To cap it all, intentions or reasons
for actions are rarely simple and singular. They are
often complex and multiple and change through time.
Consequently  there  is  never  likely  to  be  one
way to understand landscapes in terms of intentions,
but many. It becomes a multiple field of interpretive
possibilities, a dialogue between the archaeologist
and the material remains of practice. The only rea-
son to be depressed about this is if we are striving
for certainty. But that is not the name of the game in
any social science. Just as we can’t read past minds,
we can’t read those in the present either. Whether
we can even understand our own individual minds
adequately is inherently problematic. We try to make
sense of the material with which we work, explore
interpretive possibilities which may throw more, or
less light, on that which we seek to understand.
Material culture bears meaning and, because it
has meaning, a recourse to mind in terms of seeking
reasons  or  intentions  for  its  production  seems  al-
most  inevitable,  bringing  with  it  all  the  kinds  of
considerations mentioned above. Fieldwork in land-
scape archaeology crucially depends on the assign-
ment of intentionality. The art of being able to make
the statement ‘this is a round barrow’, ‘this is a mega-
lithic tomb’, as opposed to a natural undulation or
rock  in  the  land  surface,  instantly  makes  a  place
meaningful for us. Then we can ask: why is it there?
and what was it for? We do not ask such questions
with regard to natural features. This culture/nature
distinction, however, is in many ways problematic.
A hill or a rock formation which nobody has made
can, of course, be as meaningful as the round barrow
or  the  megalith  and  sometimes  more  so.  Conse-
quently we need to uncouple the concepts of mean-
ing and intentionality. The former is always assigned,
the latter occurs because of human involvement. One
of the problems of landscape research until recently
has been a failure to do this so that the significance
of ‘natural’ places for human settlement and land
use have typically been downplayed or ignored.
Meaning may, in principle, reside anywhere in
a landscape. Intentionality, by contrast, is fixed in it
through human action, but both are invested in spe-
cific places. By investigating the relationship between
natural places and cultural places in the landscape
we can hope for a fuller and more nuanced interpre-
tation. In doing so, an interpretive stress on mind in
terms of intentions and reasons becomes radically
altered. We do not require these concepts when in-
vestigating the potential significance of hills or stones
but we are, of course, still interested in the manner
in which people may have thought about and related
to these places. This is a question of perception.
The traditional view of perception is that it flows
from the mind. We are therefore dealing solely with
cognitive  processes.  An  alternative  phenomeno-
logical view suggests that perception flows from the
mind in the body. In other words, the manner in
which  humans  perceive  the  world  is  intimately
bound up with the kinds of bodies we all have, and
in  a  basic  sense,  share.  We  see  the  world  in  and
through the fleshiness of our bodies: perception is
embodied. Now this perspective moves us away from79
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a focus on intentionality and meaning as tradition-
ally understood and in the manner discussed so far.
We  do  not  just  interpret  with  our  minds  in  a
distanciated way, but through our sensing bodies.
The body, in effect, becomes a primary research tool.
We understand landscape not just through thinking
about it, employing concepts of meaning and inten-
tionality but through feeling it, through being there:
the significance of the stone or the hill as experi-
enced through the body. The logical outcome of this
perspective is to call radically into question all forms
of  landscape  research  which  are  purely  cognitive
and attempt to reconstruct reasons or intentions with-
out relating these to the physicality of bodily experi-
ence, at rest or in movement, in the landscape itself.
There is a further and more radical consequence
of this stress on the embodied nature of experience:
the need to call into question a distinction between
persons with their minds and intentions, or reasons,
and stones and hills and megaliths and barrows with-
out any of these. A notion of intentionality has al-
ways been the key attribute of agency. It creates the
familiar distinction between active subjects who think
and passive objects that are inert and may have mean-
ings ascribed to them or not. However, natural fea-
tures of the landscape have effects on people as do
cultural products. They may constrain or determine
how one may move and what one perceives. In this
sense they possess agency without thought or inten-
tionality:  they  are  more  like  subjects  than  objects
(Tilley 1999). The power of this agency has profound
effects on the manner in which we experience them
and think them through our bodies. Landscape re-
search then becomes the art of describing and dis-
cussing what kinds of effects natural features and
cultural monuments have on us through our bodily
experience of them. Quite crucially this leads to a
redefinition  of  meaning  in  which  we  move  away
from considering it simply in traditional cognitive
terms and linking it with a notion of intentionality.
In other words we can discuss the bodily effects of
landscapes: how landscapes come to be meaningful;
and uncouple this question from what these land-
scapes meant. We can suggest reasons why the posi-
tion of a natural stone or the location of a barrow
was significant without necessarily having to trans-
late this further into specific statements such as: ‘it
was significant because it may have represented a
founding ancestor’.
I will try to illustrate this point by referring to
an ongoing study of rock art in the landscape (see
Tilley 2004, ch. 4; Tilley n.d.). While rock art typi-
cally occurs on ‘natural’ stones in landscape settings
most work has ignored both. The study of rock art
has always been dominated by the attempt to inter-
pret the specific images. On one level this is simply
about denotative meaning: is it a horse or a deer, a
boat or a sledge? Then we move on to questions of
connotative meaning and almost automatically want
to know: what does this representation symbolize?
What was its significance in the mind of the person
who carved it? We go straight back to all the prob-
lems  of  trying  to  grapple  with  intentionality  and
meaning discussed above. We may get depressed
and give up altogether, or simply write the images
off in some way according to a standard rote for-
mula, e.g. as yet another example of so-called ‘en-
toptic phenomena,’ or seek another kind of solace in
the acts of documentation, and counting and meas-
uring the images.
The alternative to this is to investigate: 1) the
relationship between the images and the form and
character of the rocks on which they occur; 2) the
landscape settings and relationships between these
rocks; and 3) the manner in which the carved panels
and the individual images physically impact on an
observer  and  the  manner  in  which  perception  of
them is mediated through the human body itself,
either at rest, or in movement. It is this last point I
will expand on here.
The images themselves, according to their spe-
cific arrangement on the rock surface, clearly per-
form work. They exert an agency through the body
that must look down, look up, move among them, or
view them at a distance, walk to the right or to the
left, turn and so on. They may also, to various de-
grees, exert a purely visual fascination and power by
drawing in and transfixing vision, acting as ‘traps’
(see Gell 1998). Moving around, between and over
the decorated rocks always involves an encounter
with image fields of different densities and intensities:
those that hold attention, and those that only require
a glance, those that make you stand still and those
that demand changes of position and posture. There
is thus a theatrical and performative element to the
power  of  these  images  in  terms  of  the  degree  of
attention they hold and the experience of their en-
counter. We can thus discuss these images and the
powerful effects they have on an observer’s body
entirely without recourse to a traditional emphasis
on intentionality and meaning. Furthermore we can
compare and contrast the different bodily effects of
images on different rocks: on this rock I must move
along it in a linear fashion in order to see them, on
another rock I must move around the images in a
circular motion and so on. This is important because80
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part of the reception, and therefore the significance
of the images, was how they are perceived by an
observer. Whether the effects these images have on
our bodily reception of them was discursively in-
tended by the rock carver(s) or an unintended conse-
quence of their action(s) is something that we can then
go on to discuss. What is important here is that we
can describe and discuss the bodily effects of the im-
ages in an adequate fashion entirely without need-
ing to make reference to specific intentions in the
mind of the rock carver with regard to the meaning
of the imagery (e.g. the circle cross was a sun symbol).
Similarly, we can describe the bodily effects of
rocks, hills, monuments, etc., and their relationships
in the landscape, without recourse to a traditional
notion  of  intentionality  and  meaning.  My  answer
then to the question under debate ‘can archaeology
recover past intentions?’ is that we can indeed do
this from a phenomenological perspective stressing
embodiment,  but  not  from  a  traditional  cognitive
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